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11-435925X1

26 MAY 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities

1. This is in reply to your memorandum of 8 May 1959 expressing Air Force interest in extending and systematizing the analysis of Communist propaganda as it relates to the indications problem.

2. There can be no question about the importance, with the advent of the missile age, of thoroughly exploiting every means by which intelligence of indications value can be supplied rapidly on a continuing basis. The analysis of propaganda, as one source of indications of hostile intent, should certainly be utilized to the maximum. I am in agreement that its potentialities should be further exploited and its capabilities for rapid systematic reporting developed.

3. Discussion of the problem between [redacted] propaganda analysis people and your own representatives would seem a desirable first step. I suggest that [redacted] be contacted to arrange such a meeting at your convenience.

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SIGNED

WILLIAM W. BRYAN
Director

cc: DDCI
DD/I

20 May 59

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2 - signer ✓
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/I

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1 - McP [initials] [initials]

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11-4359/1
21 MAY 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities
REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chief, AFCIN, same subject,
dated 8 May 1959

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 6.

2. Attention is invited to the attached letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force (Tab A). This office concurs in the AFCIN view that close, continuous up-to-date analysis of Soviet Bloc propaganda can contribute significantly to the watch operation on indicators of intent to initiate hostilities. Although Bloc radios are now watched systematically for such items of obvious indicator value as troop call-ups and civil defense alerts, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the more subtle and indirect indicators as hostile intent would be present much earlier and could be gleaned by a rigorous, systematic scrutiny of the total propaganda pattern.

3. It is a sound assumption that bloc regimes would have a strong interest in psychologically preparing their own people for war, and that those regimes, aware that their propaganda for domestic consumption is heard and studied in the West, would initially use subtle rather than blatant techniques. It seems likely that in a serious crisis the Soviet leadership would attempt to build up tension in the minds of the Soviet people, engender hostility toward the anticipated adversary, and make some effort to instill a sense of confidence in their country. Under

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SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities

conditions of a contemplated surprise attack, certain subjects normal to the radio output might be excised. It may also be assumed that serious psychological conditioning for war would entail a propaganda effort different from such ersatz campaigns as the Syrian "crisis" developed in Soviet propaganda during the summer of 1957. Systematic restudy of the propaganda patterns during such crises would be required to provide a basis for sound and immediate evaluation of the patterns that may emerge in future crises.

4. The AFCIN proposal would entail quantitative (machine records) and qualitative analysis, primarily of radio but also of press materials, from the USSR, Communist China and the European Satellites, including some radio output to foreign as well as home audiences. For an effective watch on propaganda indicators, the exclusive attention of trained analysts will be imperative.

5. [REDACTED] 25X1

Although firm estimates must await detailed discussions with the Air Force, a tentative estimate is that [REDACTED] need about fifteen classi- 25X1
fied professional and clerical positions, plus four to six foreign nationals to provide collection support overseas. The latter would present little or no security hazard since they would be monitoring and processing unclassified material [REDACTED] with no need to 25X1
know the manner in which it is subsequently used. [REDACTED] 25X1

STAT [REDACTED] . As a very general estimate, approximately 2,000 square feet of floor space would be required to accommodate the headquarters function.

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SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities

6. It is recommended that:

a. The attached memorandum (Tab B) which invites Air Force people to discuss the requirement in detail [redacted]

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[redacted] be signed and forwarded to the Chief, AFCIN; and

b. [redacted] upon completion of such discussions, to submit a firm recommendation concerning the additional positions and facilities necessary to fulfill the requirements.

[redacted]

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Assistant Director for Operations

Enclosures

Tab A - Memorandum from AFCIN

Tab B - Memorandum to AFCIN

CONCUR:

[redacted]

22 MAY 1959

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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11-4073-a

20 MAY 1959

Major General James H. Walsh
Asst. Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters U. S. Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Thank you very much for your memorandum of 8 May entitled, "Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities" which I read with a great deal of interest.

I have asked our people over here to study this problem as I agree it is an important one. You will be receiving a more detailed reply in due course.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

O/DCI/ [redacted]
19 May 1959

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